S(ubstitution)-boxes are quite important components of modern symmetric cryptosystems. S-boxes bring nonlinearity to cryptosystems and strengthen their cryptographic security. An S-box satis es the strict avalanche criterion (SAC), if and only if for any single input bit of the S-box, the inversion of it changes each output bit with probability one half. We present some interesting properties of S-boxes and propose an e cient and systematic means of generating arbitrary input size bijective S-boxes satisfying the SAC by applying simple rules recursively given 3-bit input bijective S-box(es) satisfying the SAC.
Introduction For the good S-box design of DES NBS]-like cryptosystems (FEAL MSS],LOKI BPS],etc) in the open cryptologic society,
proposed the completeness condition that each output bit depends on all input bits of the substitution. Webster and Tavares WT] introduced the strict avalanche criterion(\SAC") in order to combine the notions of the completeness and the avalanche e ect Fe] . Moreover, Forr e Fo] discussed the Walsh spectral properties of S-boxes satisfying the SAC and extended the concept of SAC to the subfunctions obtained from the original function by keeping one or more input bits constant, in order to prevent partial approximation cryptanalysis. Lloyd Ll] re-stated the Forr e's extended SAC and suggested the counting functions satisfying a higher order SAC.
Some results GR], Ay] were published to design S-boxes by randomly selecting from all possible reversible transformations. Recently, Pieprzyk Pi] has proposed one construction method of S-box satisfying maximum nonlinearity 1 by exponentiation over GF(2 n ).
However in the open literature there are sparse publications concerning the systematic design methods for the generation of S-boxes satisfying the SAC. The main purpose of this paper is to suggest the properties of S-boxes satisfying the SAC and to propose the recursive construction methods of S-boxes satisfying the SAC.
Basic De nitions
We summarize here the formal de nition of the related criteria. Let Z denote the set of integers and Z n 2 denote the n-dimensional vector space over the nite eld Z 2 = GF(2). Also let denote the addition over Z n 2 , or, the bit-wise exclusive-or.
De nition 1 For a positive integer n, de ne c This means that each output bit depends on all of the input bits. Thus, if it were possible to nd the simplest Boolean expression for each output bit in terms of the input bits, each of those expressions would have to contain all of the input bits if the function is complete. If a function satis es the SAC, each of its output bits should change with a probability of one half whenever a single input bit is complemented. Clearly, a strong S-box is complete and exhibits the avalanche e ect.
If some output bits depend on only a few input bits, then, by observing a signi cant number of input-output pairs such as chosen plaintext attack, a cryptanalyst might be able to detect these relations and use this information to aid the search for the key. And because any lower-dimensional space approximation of a mapping yields a wrong result in 25 % Ba] of the cases, strong S-boxes play signi cant roles in cryptography. And also it is easy to see that Theorem 2 For n = 1; or 2, any bijective function f from Z n 2 into Z n 2 never satisfy the SAC.
Thus in order to obtain bijective strong S-boxes, we must treat at least quadratic function of at least three variables.
Use of Single Output Strong S-box
When m = 1, and n = 3 or 4, the experiments tell us that we can easily generate many strong S-boxes f : Z n 2 ! Z 2 by random search on an engineering workstation (SONY NWS810) in a few microseconds. But for the case of n 5 it becomes rather di cult to e ciently generate single output strong S-boxes in the same computational environment.
Example 1 For n = 3 and m = 1, < p >= 1; 0; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0]; < q >= 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0; 1; 0]; < r >= 1; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 0] are integer representations of strong S-boxes p, q and r respectively. By complementing the output bit of the single output strong S-box p, q and r, we have < p 0 >= 0; 1; 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1]; < q 0 >= 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 0; 1]; < r 0 >= 0; 0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1; 1]: It is easy to check that all of these functions are strong S-boxes.
By the de nition of the SAC and by the above observation, we can readily show the following. Given some single output strong S-boxes, we can generate multiple output strong S-boxes using the idea summarized in the above theorem. (However, note that a strong S-box of m = n generated by this method is not guaranteed to be bijective.)
Example 2 The 3-input 3-output S-box f de ned by f(x) = (r(x); p(x); q 0 (x)) is strong, i.e., satis es the SAC. Since < r >= 1; 1; 0; 1; 0; 1; 0; 0]; < p >= 1; 0; 1; 1; 1; 0; 0; 0]; < q 0 >= 0; 0; 0; 1; 1; 1; 0; 1]; then, the integer representation of f is < r > 4+ < p > 2+ < q 0 > = 6; 4; 2; 7; 3; 5; 0; 1]:
Thus we can conclude this section by describing that there are no di culties to e ciently generate many strong S-boxes up to the 4-bit input case.
Enlargement of Strong S-box 4.1 Construction
Next we discuss the expandable properties of strong S-boxes and present the recursive construction of strong S-boxes of arbitrary n and m.
Let us construct (n + 1)-bit input S-boxes using n-bit input S-boxes.
De nition 6 For a function f : Z n 2 ! Z 2 , an integer k 2 f1; 2; : : : ; ng and a constant b 2 Z 2 , de ne a function D k b f] : Z n+1 By using these construction methods, we can generate strong S-boxes in an e cient and systematic way. We give some examples in the next section.
Examples
Here we give detailed examples to generate strong S-boxes. By Theorem 6, we can get a strong bijective S-box : < E 1 g; f] >= 11; 1; 4; 0; 10; 13; 6; 15; 9; 3; 8; 12; 5; 2; 7; 14]:
Also by applying Thereom 6 two times, we can get 6-bit input bijective strong S-boxes : 4; 53; 16; 57; 43; 45; 2; 6; 12; 55; 63; 33; 8; 26; 30; 51; 37; 20; 41; 0; 61; 59; 22; 18; 39; 28; 49; 47; 10; 24; 35; 14; 21; 36; 25; 48; 13; 11; 38; 34; 23; 44; 1; 31; 58; 40; 19; 62; 52; 5; 32; 9; 27; 29; 50; 54; 60; 7; 15; 17; 56; 42; 46; 3]; and 36; 21; 48; 57; 43; 45; 2; 38; 12; 23; 63; 1; 8; 58; 30; 19; 37; 20; 9; 0; 29; 27; 22; 50; 39; 60; 49; 15; 10; 56; 35; 46; 53; 4; 25; 16; 13; 11; 6; 34; 55; 44; 33; 31; 26; 40; 51; 62; 52; 5; 32; 41; 59; 61; 18; 54; 28; 7; 47; 17; 24; 42; 14; 3] : As stated earlier, the experiments on the random search show that we can easily nd 3-bit input bijective strong S-boxes, but when the number of input is increased, it becomes more and more di cult to nd even a 5-bit input bijective strong S-box.
By applying Theorem 6 recursively, however, we can generate arbitrary input size bijective strong S-boxes given 3-bit input bijective strong S-boxes. This method is very useful in designing a bijective strong S-box with a larger input size.
Concluding Remarks
We have summarized the cryptographically signi cant criteria for S-boxes of symmetric cryptosystems and proved several interesting theorems of strong S-boxes. Moreover, we proposed two recursive construction methods from 3-bit input bijective strong S-box(es) to an arbitrary input size bijective strong S-box.
The generated strong S-boxes can be useful for a basic building block of symmetric cryptosystems or pseudorandom generators, etc. 
